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An E.U. Withholding
Tax?
A traditional problem for governments is how to tax
the investment income of private assets held abroad.  From
World War I through the 1980s, European governments
used capital controls—taxes or restrictions on interna-
tional trade in assets—to prevent capital from moving
abroad to escape taxation.  During the 1980s, however,
the economic integration of the European Union
required national governments to remove such controls.
At the same time, technological progress facilitated
international trade in assets.  The resulting integrated
market requires governments to cooperate in tax en-
forcement or lose the ability to tax highly mobile capital.
Since 1989, the European Union has considered
plans to prevent individuals from evading taxes on
interest income by investing abroad.  Germans, for
example, have often invested money in Luxembourg
and Switzerland to avoid high domestic taxes.  On May
21, 1998, the E.U. Commission proposed that member
states either withhold 20 percent of interest payments to
residents of other E.U. states or report the payments to
the tax office of the investor’s state.  This withholding
tax would not apply to institutional investors, whose
activities are easier to track.  The Council of Ministers
must unanimously approve the directive before the end
of 1999 to make it law.  The Council has tabled the
measure as a result of objections from the government
of the United Kingdom. 
Opponents have three main objections to the with-
holding tax.  First, because the directive does not
exempt Eurobonds—bonds denominated in a currency
other than that of the country in which it is sold—the
withholding tax would drive business away from E.U.
financial centers, primarily London, to locations outside
the European Union.  For this reason, critics compare
the withholding tax to the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax
of 1963, which spurred the relocation of the international
bond market from New York to other financial centers
like London.  The second objection pertains to the com-
plex provisions in many bonds that require issuers to
compensate the holders of the bonds for any tax.  Such
provisions would trigger the issuer’s right to repurchase
the bonds at par value.  Because the market prices of
the bonds are greater than the values for which they
may be called, such provisions would greatly benefit
bond issuers at the expense of bondholders.  Finally, the
withholding tax may be evaded successfully by moving
offshore or by using sophisticated financial instruments. 
Concerned about the position of London as an inter-
national financial center, the U.K. government recently
proposed two alternate changes to the directive.  The
first proposal suggests specifying taxable forms of inter-
est—instead of specifying exemptions—and presum-
ably omitting Eurobonds from the list of taxable securi-
ties.  The second plan grandfathers existing bonds from
the tax, exempts future bonds that are held in a major
clearinghouse system—a mechanism through which
banks and securities houses settle payments—and
applies the withholding tax only on holdings less than 
c = 40,000 (about $45,000). 
Critics of the U.K. position protest that these
changes would make the law too easy for individual
investors to circumvent.  In addition, the critics dismiss
the danger to the London Eurobond market, noting that
the retail market—to which the tax would apply—
makes up only about 10 percent of the total Eurobond
market.  This objection, however, ignores the ease with
which financial transactions can be moved around the
globe.  If retail transactions move out of London, many
wholesale transactions might migrate as well. 
At the time of this writing—October 15, 1999—the
United Kingdom still threatens to veto the withholding
tax unless the measure protects the interests of the City
of London.  The future of tax cooperation in the
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